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AbstrAct
Background The ’Productive Ward: Releasing Time 
to Care’ programme is a quality improvement (QI) 
intervention introduced in English acute hospitals a 
decade ago to: (1) Increase time nurses spend in direct 
patient care. (2) Improve safety and reliability of care. 
(3) Improve experience for staff and patients. (4) Make 
changes to physical environments to improve efficiency.
Objective To explore how timing of adoption, local 
implementation strategies and processes of assimilation 
into day-to-day practice relate to one another and shape 
any sustained impact and wider legacies of a large-scale 
QI intervention.
Design Multiple methods within six hospitals including 
88 interviews (with Productive Ward leads, ward staff, 
Patient and Public Involvement representatives and 
senior managers), 10 ward manager questionnaires and 
structured observations on 12 randomly selected wards.
Results Resource constraints and a managerial desire 
for standardisation meant that, over time, there was a 
shift away from the original vision of empowering ward 
staff to take ownership of Productive Ward towards 
a range of implementation ’short cuts’. Nonetheless, 
material legacies (eg, displaying metrics data; storage 
systems) have remained in place for up to a decade after 
initial implementation as have some specific practices 
(eg, protected mealtimes). Variations in timing of 
adoption, local implementation strategies and contextual 
changes influenced assimilation into routine practice 
and subsequent legacies. Productive Ward has informed 
wider organisational QI strategies that remain in place 
today and developed lasting QI capabilities among those 
meaningfully involved in its implementation.
Conclusions As an ongoing QI approach Productive 
Ward has not been sustained but has informed 
contemporary organisational QI practices and strategies. 
Judgements about the long-term sustainability of QI 
interventions should consider the evolutionary and 
adaptive nature of change processes.
bAckground
There is a need for greater insight into the 
assimilation of quality improvement (QI) 
interventions into day-to-day healthcare 
practice and their sustained impact.1 2 
With rare exceptions, there are few studies 
of the sustainability of such change inter-
ventions in healthcare organisations.3–5
The ‘Productive Ward: Releasing Time 
to Care’ programme is a QI intervention 
which aims to give ward staff the tools, 
skills and time needed to implement local 
improvements in order to: (1) Increase 
time nurses spend in direct patient care. 
(2) Improve safety and reliability of 
care. (3) Improve experience for staff 
and patients. (4) Make changes to phys-
ical environments to improve efficiency. 
The rationale for Productive Ward was 
strongly marketed as empowering front-
line staff, especially nurses, to ‘take back 
control’ of their wards and—through effi-
ciency savings—‘release time to care’.
The NHS Institute for Innovation and 
Improvement in England developed 
Productive Ward in 2005/2006 for appli-
cation in hospitals and wards, and was 
first implemented in 2007.6 7 Produc-
tive Ward is a self-directed QI toolkit 
consisting of three foundational modules 
(‘Well Organised Ward’, ‘Knowing How 
We are Doing’ and ‘Patient Status At a 
Glance’) and eight modules dealing with 
specific ward processes (eg, shift hando-
vers, meals and medicines rounds).8 The 
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Table 1 Potential compatibility gaps
Transformation The adopting hospital modifies its functioning to fit the assumptions behind Productive Ward and the actual use of 
Productive Ward does not significantly differ from its intended use.
Customisation Involves both adapting Productive Ward and adjusting ward processes.
Loose coupling Productive Ward is adopted only superficially, in a ritualistic way with the functioning of the hospital remaining largely 
unaffected.
Co-optation Productive Ward becomes captured and distorted to serve the interests of the most powerful stakeholders.
modules were supplemented by guides for ward, 
project and executive leaders to aid implementation. 
Guidance included encouragement to think about 
sustainability from an early stage,8 although a specific 
‘sustainability tool’ was not developed until after the 
initial launch.
As a large-scale QI intervention Productive Ward 
has three distinctive features. First, it underwent a 
systematic and extensive design and development 
process prior to widespread adoption.7 It was designed 
through collaboration with industry partners, drew on 
social movement theory, and was developed incremen-
tally through piloting and refining modules in collab-
oration with hospitals.7 Second, Productive Ward was 
adopted very rapidly and widely after being formally 
launched in January 2008. In May 2008, the govern-
ment invested £50 million to support the implemen-
tation of Productive Ward in all acute hospitals in 
England.8 By May 2012 it was reported that 70% of 
all acute wards in the UK were implementing Produc-
tive Ward.9 Third, Productive Ward is remarkable 
with respect to the scale of the claims made regarding 
its (potential and achieved) impact. This included a 
report predicting that a £270 million benefit would 
result from implementing Productive Ward across 
acute hospitals in England by March 2014.10 However, 
a decade after the initial development of Produc-
tive Ward—and despite its widespread adoption and 
ongoing use in several other countries—there remains 
little robust evidence of its impact on acute wards in 
England. Literature reviews either focus on imple-
mentation strategies11 or highlight a lack of clarity 
between activities, perceived impact and measurable 
outcomes.12
Our overall research aim is to explore the impacts 
and wider legacies of the Productive Ward since its 
introduction over a decade ago. Responding to a 
call for more ‘theoretically informative improvement 
research’13 we seek to add to knowledge relating to the 
implementation and assimilation of QI interventions 
into routine day-to-day practice, and their sustain-
ability in terms of maintenance of benefits, continua-
tion of activities and continued capacity manifesting at 
individual, ward and/or hospital level.14
Methods
We conducted a multiple methods study in six case 
studies comprising purposively sampled acute hospi-
tals. We used multiple sources of information to 
arrive at ‘best guess’ dates for all adopting English 
acute hospitals to sample hospitals estimated to have 
adopted Productive Ward in different years, with the 
aim of attaining maximum variation. We also sampled 
for diversity with respect to region, type and size 
(number of wards) of hospital. Data collection during 
the period March 2017 to February 2018 comprised 
a total of: 88 semistructured interviews (with Produc-
tive Ward leads, ward staff, Patient and Public Involve-
ment representatives and senior managers); structured 
observations to note material legacies and observ-
able processes on 12 randomly selected wards (two 
in each hospital) using a template based on the goals 
of Productive Ward; and 10 ward manager question-
naires on processes not observable without intrusion, 
also based on Productive Ward goals. Eligible wards 
were those that had implemented the three Produc-
tive Ward foundation modules and at least one process 
module. To analyse the interview data we used the 
Framework method.15 Initial themes were developed 
from: the theoretical literature (see below); the topic 
guide (itself reflecting theoretical and empirical litera-
ture); familiarity with interviews; and inductive coding 
of four transcripts.
We retrospectively analysed the adoption, implemen-
tation, assimilation and legacies of Productive Ward 
in each of our case studies. In doing so we purpose-
fully distinguished between implementation (formal 
strategies to promote the integration of interventions 
into existing practices) and assimilation (the informal 
process by which, over time, new ideas become part 
of routine ways of doing things). We categorised the 
strategies used to implement Productive Ward in each 
hospital using a published framework which provided 
a comprehensive categorised list of published imple-
mentation strategies16 and compared the execution of 
these strategies against Productive Ward guidance to 
assess fidelity. We then drew on potential ‘compatibility 
gaps’ between the assumptions underlying the design 
and implementation of managerial innovations and 
the characteristics of adopting organisations3 17 18 and 
the definitions in table 1—as adapted from Kislov3—
to characterise the interplay between the hospitals and 
the Productive Ward over time.
Descriptive case studies were written based on the 
overall framework. Documentary, observational and 
ward manager questionnaire data were included at 
this stage. During analysis, within cases we looked for 
concordances and differences between interviewees’ 
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Table 2 Changing forms of assimilation over time (with illustrative examples)
Hospital
Form of assimilation at time of fieldwork (up to 
10 years post-adoption)
Post-implementation (typically year 2 
onwards)
Form of assimilation during implementation 
(typically years 0–2)
A Customisation
 ► Whole hospital transformation programme inspired 
by Productive Ward
 ► Hospital-wide system of shared governance to 
capture staff suggestions on QI
 ► Former facilitators re-deployed to other 
projects
 ► Wards felt that Productive Ward no longer 
a Trust priority
 ► Evolution: of Patient Status At a Glance 
to e-system; Knowing How We are Doing 
boards re-evaluated; shift to Accountability 
Handovers; revisiting processes (some 
wards)
Transformation
 ► All wards implemented most modules
 ► Standardised Efficient storage system throughout 
hospital; better stock management; designated areas 
for equipment; extra equipment purchased
 ► Knowing How We are Doing and Patient Status At a 
Glance boards on all wards
 ► Greater staff voice in QI and increased familiarity 
with data
B Customisation
 ► Still part of nursing development lead remit; ad hoc 
support given to wards by original lead
 ► Two ward managers continue to have protected 
time (1 day a month)
 ► Other wards continue to revisit processes, though 
not using Productive Ward tools
 ► Hospital-level discussions underway re-improving 
use of ward-level data and display
 ► End of funding for leads although 
continued to support
 ► Remaining wards implemented after initial 
2-year implementation period
 ► Storage overhauled post-implementation
 ► Impacts on wards sustained for 1 year
 ► Became part of remit of nursing 
development lead
 ► Two ward managers given protected time 
(1 day a month) to implement on their 
wards
Transformation
 ► All wards implemented three foundation modules and 
at least four process modules
 ► ‘Direct Care Time’ reportedly increased in most wards 
by 15%–20%
 ► Standardised efficient storage system; better stock 
management; designated areas for equipment; extra 
equipment purchased
 ► Knowing How We are Doing and Patient Status At a 
Glance boards on all wards
 ► Greater staff voice in QI
C ‘Loose coupling’ (see text)
 ► ‘Trust Quality Bundle’ still being implemented and 
developed. But evidence that ward manager-led 
(rather than teams); modules seldom rerun
 ► Poor reach of staff involvement in QI
 ► Standardised Knowing How We are Doing boards 
still being used (but out of date)
 ► Productive Ward storage still in place
 ► Developed a QI ‘bundle’ (‘Trust Quality 
Bundle’), which used Productive Ward as 
a framework but incorporated relevant 
elements of other QI programmes
 ► Introduction of Datix web-based incident 
reporting and risk management software 
in place of Safety Crosses
Customisation
 ► Limited number of modules implemented
 ► ‘Direct Care Time’ reportedly doubled
 ► Knowing How We are Doing boards introduced on all 
wards; data not used
 ► Patient Status At a Glance boards, standardised meals 
processes/protected mealtimes introduced to all wards
 ► Storage and stock control improved
D ‘Loose coupling’ (see text)
 ► Display and use of data embedded; Safety Crosses 
still used
 ► Electronic Patient Status At a Glance, and 
standardised Knowing How We are Doing boards 
still in use
 ► Influence on ongoing QI work
 ► Lean training available to all staff
 ► Limited junior staff engagement with QI
 ► Continued for 12 months
 ► Shift handover evolved and ‘Trust Way’ 
equivalent of Knowing How We are Doing 
was increasingly tailored to ward
 ► New board members marked shift to 
different QI programme. ‘Trust Way’ leads 
re-deployed; standard Knowing How We 
are Doing Boards introduced
Customisation
 ► Hospital developed own QI tool (‘Trust Way’); 
consisted of adapted versions of the foundation 
modules and sustainment process
 ► Trust Way extended to non-ward areas
 ► Standardised shift handover and protected mealtime 
policies introduced
 ► Poor engagement of junior staff
 ► Changes made to physical environment
E Loose coupling
 ► Non-standard Knowing How We are Doing and 
Patient Status At a Glance boards in all wards
 ► Safety Crosses still used on some wards, but in 
some cases ritualistically (not clear or regularly 
updated)
 ► Some ward managers continued to use Productive 
Ward principles and QI skills
 ► Initial implementation period extended for 
a further 12 months
 ► Implementation team then re-deployed
 ► Widespread reorganisation of wards in one 
hospital, along with staff shortages meant 
wards there stopped implementing
 ► No wards reran any modules once the 
team had been redeployed
Loose coupling
 ► No strategic patient public Involvement
 ► Limited number of modules implemented
 ► Poor engagement with junior ward staff
 ► Training given to ward managers only
 ► Standardised Patient Status At a Glance boards
 ► Changes to physical ward environment
 ► Some processes standardised
F Loose coupling
 ► Well Organised Ward principles still evident
 ► Standardised Knowing How We are Doing boards 
in all wards but in some cases ritualistically (not 
relevant or not regularly updated)
 ► Safety Crosses still used on some wards, but in 
some cases ritualistically (not clear or regularly 
updated)
 ► Some ward processes still in place
 ► Evidence of ward staff involvement in continuous QI
 ► Operational group set up at the end of the 
implementation period
 ► Productive Ward reported as pivotal in 
Trust’s decision to set up a QI department
 ► Physical infrastructure of the new hospital: 
Increased mileage walked by ward 
staff and time spent away from direct 
care; additional equipment bought to 
compensate for offward storage
 ► Patient Status At a Glance was developed 
into an electronic system
 ► Admissions and discharge work was 
further developed
Co-optation
 ► Implementation shaped by requirements of new 
building (standard layout of wards; single rooms so 
bedside handover required)
 ► Only wards due to move to new building included in 
roll-ut plan
 ► Limited number of modules implemented
 ► Wards told which modules to implement
 ► Standardised Knowing How We are Doing and Patient 
Status At a Glance boards introduced to all wards
 ► Standardised changes made to storage and 
stocktaking
QI, quality improvement.
accounts and between data sets and treated these as 
data. For example, interviews with lower grades of 
staff were sometimes at odds with programme leaders’ 
accounts of their involvement; or observations of 
wards sometimes belied interview accounts of legacy. 
We conducted a cross-case analysis of our six case 
studies, linking legacies to the processes of adoption, 
implementation and assimilation.
results
Below we work backwards by first setting out the lega-
cies of the Productive Ward as we observed them in 
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the six hospitals at the time of our fieldwork (up to 
10 years postadoption). We then explain the variation 
in these legacies by considering the ways in which the 
Productive Ward was assimilated into routine prac-
tice, and how different implementation strategies and 
timing of adoption may have shaped these long-term 
organisational processes.
legacies of the Productive Ward
Material legacies
In each of the six hospitals we observed material lega-
cies of the Productive Ward which remained up to 10 
years after initial implementation. Notwithstanding 
the differing forms of assimilation of the programme 
in the six hospitals—and how these evolved over time 
(see below)—we noted that displays of ward metrics 
data, use of ‘safety crosses’ (to show daily patient 
harm incidents per month) and storage systems were 
commonplace on the 12 wards we studied. While 
maintaining these outward signs of Productive Ward, 
in day-to-day practice legacies had sometimes become 
disconnected from their original purpose. For instance, 
safety crosses were not always clear, up to date or on 
public display and ‘Knowing How We are Doing’ 
boards could include data that were difficult to inter-
pret, often out of date and seemingly rarely discussed 
by ward teams.
Process legacies
Our structured observations found that 7 of 18 
potential process legacies arising from the modules 
were still present on all 12 wards (for example, the 
menu process being conducted outside of mealtimes 
and the presence of a system for flagging patients 
who had missed observations). In contrast, three of 
these potential legacies were not evident on any of 
the 12 wards; none displayed a ‘ward vision’, written 
standard operating procedures or an up-to-date ‘Visit 
Pyramid’ (a graphic display indicating predeter-
mined visits by executive and senior staff which are 
focused on Productive Ward progress). Ward manager 
responses to our questionnaires suggested several 
other standardised processes were commonly still in 
place (for example, equipment being in the right place 
and ready to use). The extent to which these processes 
solely originated with—and have been maintained 
by—Productive Ward was sometimes unclear. The 
Productive Ward resources (ie, the guide booklets and 
toolkit itself) are now rarely used. Nonetheless, staff 
who had been meaningfully involved in the initial 
implementation of Productive Ward (mostly Produc-
tive Ward leads, ward managers and their deputies) 
identified wider legacies, such as using Plan-Do-
Study-Act improvement cycles, having a ‘lean’ mindset 
regarding cutting out waste and improving flow, and 
giving ward staff a greater voice in QI.
QI capabilities
Over time the impact of Productive Ward was not 
confined to individuals or wards; it also shaped QI 
capabilities within hospitals. By the end of our study 
whole hospital QI programmes which were at least 
partially based on Productive Ward were still opera-
tional in Hospitals A and C. Hospital A operated a 
shared governance system to capture staff suggestions 
for QI while Hospital C was still implementing and 
developing it’s ‘Trust Quality Bundle’ which had been 
adapted from Productive Ward. Hospital F’s experi-
ence with Productive Ward led them to create both 
a new Head of Nursing for QI role and a central QI 
team who delivered training. Former leads of Produc-
tive Ward were still offering Productive Ward support 
to wards in Hospital B, and training in Lean and QI to 
all staff in Hospitals D and F.
Assimilation
Table 2 applies Kislov et al’s3 definitions of the poten-
tial ‘compatibility gaps’ to the six hospitals and the 
Productive Ward during three time periods: at the 
time of our fieldwork (up to 10 years post-adoption), 
post-implementation and initial implementation.
In two of the six hospitals (A and B) we would define 
what had occurred during the initial implementation 
period as ‘transformation’; the use of the Productive 
Ward was as intended (table 2). By the end of the 
decade ‘customization’ was a more accurate descrip-
tion of how the programme had been assimilated into 
routine organisational practices in these sites. In Hospi-
tals E and F we found that Productive Ward modules 
and tools were being used superficially, in a ritualistic 
way (if at all), with the functioning of the hospitals 
remaining largely unchanged (what Kislov et al would 
refer to as ‘loose-coupling’3). Such ‘loose coupling’ 
had implications for the relatively limited nature and 
scale of the legacies we observed in Hospitals E and F.
More nuanced were the stories of the remaining 
two hospitals. Hospitals C and D adapted Productive 
Ward significantly while retaining some of the tools; 
Hospital C also retained the ‘look’ of Productive 
Ward with its trademark graphic of a house built of 
(modular) ‘bricks’. Hospital C had radically customised 
Productive Ward following the implementation period 
and assimilated the programme in this adapted form 
with other relevant QI programmes to avoid duplica-
tion; modules were modified and new modules added 
over time to meet new priorities and this continued to 
operate at the time of our fieldwork (although with 
some evidence that this may have been something 
of a paper exercise performed by ward managers on 
the wards we studied). In Hospital D, which merged 
its nascent Productive Ward programme with ‘Lean-
based’ training it had already commissioned, we found 
organisational-level legacies of Productive Ward (use of 
data, availability of training, influence of ongoing QI 
strategies) but little involvement of lower staff bands in 
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Table 3 Implementation guidance and fidelity in case study hospitals
Guidance from programme developers*
Levels of fidelity by hospital
Examples of medium/low 
fidelityA B C D E F
Strategic alignment Define clear goals that align 
with Trust strategy; secure 
executive support
Insufficient data
Implementation and 
governance structures
Set-up: steering group 
(including chief executive 
officer, executive leader, 
medical director, finance 
director, general managers, 
nursing managers); 
implementation team; ward 
teams (including matron and 
representatives from all staff 
groups)
Medium Medium Medium Low Medium Medium  ► No steering group (D)
 ► Steering group did not 
include medical/ finance 
directors (A, B, C, F)
 ► Matrons omitted from 
ward team implementation 
(A)
 ► Doctors not engaged at 
ward level (B, C, D, E)
 ► Limited reach/scope of 
ward staff involvement (D)
Project planning Create project plan including: 
roll-out sequence; timetable; 
resources required; activities; 
outcomes checklist; progress 
reviews
High High High High High High
Selecting showcase 
wards
Invite applications and select 
showcase wards using the 
NHSI selection template and 
sustainability model and 
guide
High Medium Low Medium Medium Low  ► No application process (B, 
C, D, E, F)
 ► Wards chosen based on 
patient demographics and 
incidents (high risk) (C)
 ► Readiness to start not 
measured (F)
Implementation scope Wards to evaluate current 
practice with respect to all 
modules
High Medium Low Medium High Medium  ► Only limited number 
modules implemented on 
all implementing wards 
(typically three foundation 
modules plus one to three 
more) (B, C, D, F)
 ► Roll-out restricted to 
half the wards for first 2 
years (C)
Productive Ward 
Leader role
Leading Productive Ward 
Facilitators; tracking progress 
and quality; strategic learning; 
stakeholder management; 
updating executive leader
High High High High High High
Productive Ward 
Facilitator role, ward 
support and training
Support and guide wards 
and ward managers (not to 
do the tasks, or act without 
ward managers’ agreement); 
provide training
High High High High Medium Medium  ► Productive Ward 
Facilitators did much of the 
implementation work (E, F)
Productive Ward 
Facilitator role (other)
Monitor implementation and 
measurement; work with 
central services
High High n/a High High High
Communication Create and use a 
communication plan—‘who, 
what, when, how, why’
Insufficient data
*These columns derive from the NHS Institute for Innovation and Improvement Executive Leader’s Guide and Project Leader’s Guide.
NHSI, NHS Institute for Innovation and Improvement.
Productive Ward-related activities. We found locating 
Hospitals C and D within Kislov et al’s framework3 
problematic and return to this issue in our discussion.
Implementing Productive Ward
Fidelity to implementation guidance
Implementation of the Productive Ward was 
supported by detailed guides for ward, project and 
executive leaders. We found a consistent failure to 
extend strategic engagement beyond nursing in their 
steering groups (see table 3). The—typically—2-year, 
time-limited availability of funding was usually insuf-
ficient to enable hospital-wide implementation in the 
way that was intended by its designers (particularly in 
larger organisations with high numbers of wards, see 
table 4).
There were three key areas in which the hospitals 
differed. First, hospital A was the only hospital to 
follow guidance on how it selected early ‘showcase 
wards’ by inviting and assessing applications based 
on a ‘sustainability guide’; the five remaining hospi-
tals either relied on nomination by senior nurses or 
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Table 4 Study sample: characteristics and resourcing
Hospital
Type of acute 
hospital
Region in 
England
Implementation 
period (start date 
and duration)
Wards 
implemented/ 
total wards External funding/support Productive Ward dedicated staff
A Teaching Midlands and 
East
2007
4 years
72/72  ► External funding from the NHSI for 2 
years for 4 PWFs
 ► NHSI also funded provision of external 
support from external delivery partner 
who helped to plan implementation 
strategy, trained Productive Ward team, 
and offered face-to-face support and 
challenge
 ► No backfill for ward staff time
 ► A hospital-wide PWL, a project 
support officer/data manager (these 
two posts funded by Trust) and 4 
PWFs; all full-time on Productive 
Ward for at least 2 years
 ► Two of the 4 PWFs remained in 
post for a further 2 years (funded by 
hospital)
B Specialist London 2008
2 years
13/13 SHA funding of approximately £250 000 for:
‘accelerated membership support 
package’ from NHSI (provided support 
for up to 10 staff, including 4 days 
training from NHSI for PWL, executive 
sponsor & eight ward managers from 
the early cohorts)
A PWL for 2 years
Backfill for ward managers 
implementing Productive Ward
Contribution to new equipment costs
 ► 1 PWL for 2 years working full-time 
on Productive Ward
C Large South 2007
3 years 2 months
38/40  ► 6 months support from Lean Enterprise 
Academy funded by NHSI
 ► External funding from the NHSI for 1 
year for PWL and backfill for ward staff
 ► Additional 2 PWFs after first year funded 
by NHSI for 6 months
 ► 1 PWL (funded by NHSI) and 3 PWFs 
(funded by hospital) full-time for 12 
months
 ► Additional 2 PWFs for 6 months 
(funded by SHA)
 ► 1.7 PWFs (funded by hospital) for 
14 months
D Small North 2009
2 years
25/25  ► No external funding
 ► Training in Lean from Unipart Expert 
Practices
 ► 1 Unipart facilitator for 1 year.
 ► 1 PWL and 2 PWFs (1 from Unipart) 
working full-time for 1 year (funded 
by hospital)
 ► One full-time PWF for second year 
(funded by hospital)
 ► Ad hoc support from QI team but no 
ward staff backfill funding
E Multiservice South 2008
2 years 7 months
34/34  ► Three posts (PWL, PWF, administrator) 
funded by SHA for 18 months); then 
extended from charitable funds for a 
further 12 months
 ► No funding for ward staff backfill
 ► 1 PWL, 1 PWF and 1 Productive Ward 
administrator working full-time on 
Productive Ward for 2½ years.
F Large South 2011
1 year 9 months
40/47  ► No external funding
 ► No NHSI training or networking events 
running by this stage
 ► 1 PWL and ‘mentor’ with Productive 
Ward as part of their remit; and 2 
PWFs working full-time (all funded by 
hospital) for 2 years
 ► No funding for ward staff backfill
NHSI, NHS Institute for Innovation and Improvement; PWF, Productive Ward Facilitator; PWL, Productive Ward Leader; SHA, Strategic Health Authority.
selected wards because they had stable staffing, a keen 
ward manager or were deemed ‘high risk’. Second, 
the earliest adopting hospitals, which had either 
helped develop the materials/toolkit or had exten-
sive training from the original designers of Productive 
Ward (Hospitals A, B and C) (see table 4) had better 
engagement across staff bands and groups than other 
hospitals. Third, only two hospitals (A and E) included 
all modules in their roll-out plan.
There was considerable variation between wards in the 
same hospital in terms of implementation. Attitudes of 
ward managers, and the degree to which they involved 
staff in any meaningful way, was one issue. Another 
was that implementation efforts become laboured and 
Productive Ward teams overstretched as they either 
began to run out of time to implement all the mandatory 
modules in their targeted number of wards before their 
funding ceased or progressed to the more challenging 
wards and/or time-consuming modules.
Timing of adoption and local implementation strategies
Beyond fidelity to the guidance, we found variations 
in the implementation strategies used by the six hospi-
tals. Applying Waltz et al’s categorisation revealed that 
some elements of local approaches to implementation 
were common, (for example, ‘providing interactive 
assistance’16) but there were also important differ-
ences. First, there was variation in terms of dedicated 
resources. Timing of adoption was significant in this 
regard (table 4). Hospitals A, B and C (earlier adopting 
organisations) received government funding towards 
salaries for dedicated Productive Ward leads, mate-
rials, backfill for ward managers (Hospitals B and C) 
and expert training; they also had access to supportive 
networks. In contrast, Hospital F adopted Productive 
Ward after such funding and networks had ceased. 
There was wide variation in the numbers of wards in 
the hospital’s roll-out plans (13 in hospital C to 72 
in hospital A, table 4) and the number of modules 
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each ward was expected to implement, and therefore 
the workload for Productive Ward leads. Whether 
there was a dedicated lead with time to monitor and 
encourage ongoing efforts shaped staff engagement 
over time.
Second, hospitals A, B, C, D and E purchased expert 
training and support from external providers. In most 
hospitals training to managers of two to three ‘show-
case’ wards was provided by Productive Ward leads 
and facilitators. But in Hospital B—a small Trust—8 
of the 10 ward managers received the expert training 
directly. It is likely that the relatively high proportion 
of wards receiving expert training in Hospital B was 
the reason it stood out in that, first, ward managers 
continued to implement further modules beyond initial 
support, and second, it had a notable legacy in terms 
of staff continuing to make changes according to the 
underlying principles of Productive Ward. Hospitals A 
and C—2 years into implementation, in parallel with a 
reduction in funding—changed their strategy, moving 
from providing intensive, tailored training to small 
cohorts of wards towards mass training to ward repre-
sentatives, module by module. Poor reach of training 
to all levels of staff in Hospitals E and F meant few 
staff were demonstrating ‘Productive Ward thinking’ 
at the time of our fieldwork.
A third key difference was how hospitals evaluated 
implementation and sustainability, and set up systems 
to measure outcomes. All hospitals were poor at 
collating ward-level ‘before implementation’ measures 
and cost data. After implementation began Hospital 
A employed a data manager who designed a ward-
level data dashboard for capturing monthly outcome 
measures (although these data were not used strategi-
cally at the hospital level). The two hospitals that stood 
out in terms of evaluative strategies were those where 
the Productive Ward team were integrated within 
an existing QI (Hospital D) or change management 
(Hospital F) team. These hospitals were also notable 
in forming strategic relationships with central services 
to aid implementation. Hospital D attempted to build 
in sustainability from the start of their implemen-
tation strategy, using a local system of monthly spot 
checks, audit sheets, required actions and reporting; in 
Hospital F ward-level monthly reports included iden-
tification of risks to sustainability. Despite this, signifi-
cant events in each of the two hospitals (changes in the 
senior executive team in Hospital D and a move to a 
new hospital location in Hospital F) meant that in both 
cases Productive Ward—as an active programme—
effectively ceased shortly after the implementation 
period.
The fourth difference in implementation approach 
was the involvement of patients. While patients were 
represented on the Productive Ward steering group 
in Hospitals A, C and F, there was minimal involve-
ment of inpatients on wards in all hospitals. Hospital 
A, which had a relatively strong history of patient 
involvement, stood out in how it harnessed patient/
public input.
dIscussIon
In seeking to address calls to examine both the ‘extent, 
nature (and) impact of adaptations to … programmes 
once implemented’19 and to ‘yield new theoretical 
insights applicable to a broader range of settings’,13 
we have explored (although retrospectively) how 
adoption, implementation and assimilation processes 
shaped variations in the legacies of a QI programme 
in six hospitals over a 10-year period. Our findings 
emphasise how sustainability is best considered as an 
evolutionary and adaptive process of change, rather 
than a stable state.14
For the most part, Productive Ward was designed to 
address the needs of nurses working on wards. The 
components we typically observed as having been 
sustained (Well Organised Ward and Patient Status 
At a Glance boards) were those used—and found 
useful—by a majority of nursing staff. Productive 
Ward did also develop QI capacity among those staff 
meaningfully involved in its implementation. We also 
found evidence of how the programme helped shape 
contemporary hospital-wide QI strategies. However, 
we found several examples of ‘improvements’ being 
present on wards but only applied in a superficial and 
ritualistic way (particularly Hospitals E and F). For 
example, while Productive Ward was undoubtedly part 
of an emerging movement to make metrics visible and 
public—through Knowing How We are Doing boards 
and Safety Crosses—to avoid stasis hospitals need to 
regularly retrain staff in their use and take advantage 
of technological developments if intended wider bene-
fits were to be realised on an ongoing basis.
When considering our empirical findings in the 
light of earlier accounts3 17–19 we would propose 
three refinements to existing theories. First, we agree 
with Addicott et al18 that there can be ‘temporal 
flow’ between the compatibility gap typology origi-
nally developed by Lozeau et al; as Kislov et al later 
noted rather than ‘distinct independent categories’ 
the four types can indeed ‘represent stages of the 
same process’.3 We would argue that there is now a 
similar need in recent categorisations of implemen-
tation strategies16 20 to better recognise an emergent, 
temporal element and how these interact with assim-
ilation processes to shape legacies of large-scale QI 
programmes. To illustrate, over time we noted—both 
within and between our six hospitals—a shift away 
from a longer-term vision of empowering ward teams 
to take ownership of the programme (by implementing 
the modules themselves—‘transformation’) towards a 
narrower, solely efficiency-based view of the goals of 
Productive Ward (to be achieved through top-down 
standardisation and performance measures—‘loose-
coupling’, ‘co-optation’); this may explain the limited 
long-term legacies we observed in the later adopting 
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Table 5 Seven lessons for leaders of large-scale quality improvement programmes to consider when reflecting on the story of 
‘Productive Ward: Releasing Time to Care’
Think beyond the immediate 
team
 ► Although many nurses identified with Productive Ward, other staff groups were seldom engaged which undermined ongoing 
improvements to multidisciplinary processes.
 ► In focusing exclusively on ward and nursing processes, the original framing and format of the programme would not meet current 
demands for multidisciplinary teamwork and system transformation.
 ► Involving wider ward teams from the start could have helped mitigate risks to sustainability posed by staff turnover.
Ensure adequate resourcing for 
task completion and reflection
 ► Funding was needed both to release staff from ward duties (so they could carry out Productive Ward activities) and to enable them to 
reflect on experiential learning in relation to the underlying principles of the programme (so they could then go on to apply them in 
changing contexts).
 ► The typical 2-year funding period was, in most cases, insufficient to enable implementation of all the modules as intended.
 ► A dedicated member of staff was needed to coordinate activities and ongoing training within organisations, as well as demonstrating 
organisational commitment to the programme. This role was key to realising sustained impacts.
Focus on quality not quantity  ► Take time to implement foundational modules fully and share lessons learnt and outcomes.
 ► As implementation progressed programme leads tended to run out of time and energy, and in later wards ‘solutions’ were imposed 
by programme leads and/or ward managers without giving other staff opportunities to identify solutions. This led to a sense of ‘being 
done to’ (rather than shared ownership).
 ► Focus on outcomes achieved or lessons learnt, rather than simply recording progress through a staged programme.
Less may be more  ► Productive Ward would have benefited from being more focused. The modules that were most frequently implemented were: the 
‘Foundation modules’ (Well Organised Ward; Patient Status at a Glance; Knowing How We are Doing); followed by four of the process 
modules (Medicines; Meals; Patient Observations; and Shift Handovers).
 ► The remaining four process modules were rarely implemented in any meaningful way.
Play the long game  ► Adequate before/after and longitudinal data are required to demonstrate impact.
 ► Efficient local systems for enabling measurement of impacts and costs (initial and over time) should be built in from the start.
 ► The reputation of the Productive Ward suffered to some degree from overclaiming benefits at a national level without a sufficiently 
longitudinal or robust evidence base.
 ► Build considerations of sustainability and develop related guidance into the initial design and testing of a programme.
Adaptability  ► QI programmes need to be flexible. A programme such as Productive Ward needs to be able to absorb and adapt to changing 
organisational or system priorities so that relevant learning and resources can be applied to new priorities, rather than entirely new QI 
programmes being designed to replace or run alongside existing initiatives.
 ► Having guidance and toolkits available online where they can be revised and redirected, rather than hard copies of modules, would 
better support this.
Involve patients and carers as 
partners
 ► Involve patients, carers and the public. Although guidance suggested roles for patients, visitors and patient representatives at ward 
and hospital level, such involvement was generally low to non-existent.
 ► Recent interest in—and examples of—how co-production can underpin QI work hold important lessons for meaningful and 
imaginative ways in which service users can and should be part of designing and evaluating programmes like the Productive Ward.
hospitals who—with fewer resources—appeared to 
begin from this narrower view. Such shifts and deci-
sions manifested themselves in a range of implemen-
tation ‘short cuts’ motivated by time constraints and 
a managerial desire for standardisation. These short 
cuts seemed to occur where there were conflicting 
rationales for the programme among different stake-
holders; for example, where a managerial efficiency 
agenda took precedence over ‘releasing time to care’ 
on wards. There was often tension between wards’ 
desire to find their own solutions to their problems, 
and hospital managers’ desire for standard practices 
and infrastructure that made it easier for staff to work 
across a hospital and which could deliver economies 
of scale (for example, when purchasing equipment). 
One such ‘short cut’—in hospitals where Productive 
Ward was relatively under-resourced—saw ward teams 
excluded from implementation of the programme. For 
example, in Hospital F facilitators—rather than ward 
staff—did much of the work including imposing ‘solu-
tions’. Where—as intended—whole ward teams had 
been trained in the principles underlying Productive 
Ward (Hospital B and initially in Hospital A) we found 
that staff continued to apply these principles to their 
QI work even as organisational contexts changed over 
time. This finding has parallels with that of Jones et al 
who identified ‘collective change agency’ as one way of 
closing a compatibility gap between a QI intervention 
and adopting hospital.13 19 More positive legacies were 
apparent at the time of our fieldwork in those hospi-
tals (A, B, C and D) which enacted (and importantly 
maintained) higher fidelity to empowering ward-based 
teams as a fundamental aspect of the recommended 
implementation approach.
Second, Lozeau et al have previously raised a possible 
contradiction between a rhetoric of empowerment (as 
in the Productive Ward) and command-and-control 
procedures for auditing performance data.17 Addicott 
Library. Protected by copyright.
 o
n
 8 August 2019 at Periodicals Departm
ent G
eorge Edwards
http://qualitysafety.bmj.com/
BM
J Qual Saf: first published as 10.1136/bmjqs-2019-009457 on 29 July 2019. Downloaded from 
9Robert G, et al. BMJ Qual Saf 2019;0:1–10. doi:10.1136/bmjqs-2019-009457
Original research
et al highlighted empirically how ‘top down’ distortions 
through ‘performance management systems set up by the 
remote centre’ limited the intended impact of managed 
clinical networks for cancer.18 In contrast, local Produc-
tive Ward leads and managers were important actors who 
developed their own ward-level monthly implementa-
tion reports, as well as local systems of regular audits and 
monitoring. Rather than distorting the Productive Ward, 
such locally developed audits—in the absence of remote 
‘top down’ guidance or performance measures—did 
appear to support sustainability. By contrast, it seemed 
that when ward staff became aware that no one locally 
was paying attention, work on the programme quickly 
ceased. This observation contributes to Kislov et al’s 
call for better understanding of how local leaders can 
balance sensible adaptation of QI interventions with the 
risk of distortion of core elements of a programme such 
as Productive Ward.3
Third, Jones et al have previously suggested that 
‘loose-coupling’ between a QI intervention and an 
adopting hospital can occur when implementation 
stalls because of simultaneous improvement initiatives 
overburdening staff.19 While this was certainly true in 
some of the hospitals we studied, the resilience of the 
QI strategy which was informed by Productive Ward in 
Hospital C lay in how it absorbed several overlapping 
initiatives which might otherwise have been competing 
against each other for limited attention and resources. 
To a lesser extent we saw similar patterns in Hospitals 
A and D. Our findings suggest a need to develop and 
validate a more nuanced classification of assimilation 
processes than that previously forwarded.3 17–19 Intel-
ligent ‘customization’ of the programme at an early 
stage (Hospitals C and D) gave way to more evolu-
tionary forms of ‘loose-coupling’ where hospitals 
took account of the assumptions behind Productive 
Ward to make a wider, positive impact, even though 
the programme was no longer being used as intended. 
These were markedly different forms of assimilation to 
those observed in Hospitals E and F.
Table 5 summarises the implications arising from 
of our findings for the design and delivery of future 
large-scale QI programmes.
There are several limitations to our study. First, given 
the retrospective nature of the fieldwork it was some-
times challenging to trace possible legacies of Produc-
tive Ward since one or more other QI interventions had 
often been implemented concurrently or subsequently. 
Furthermore, wards and hospitals varied with respect to 
the number of staff available who had been in post during 
implementation of the programme. Second, assimilation 
was a challenging concept to explore retrospectively 
over such a lengthy time period. Lastly, much of our 
data come from two randomly selected wards in our 
case study hospitals. Ward practices, perhaps especially 
QI work, are strongly influenced by ward managers. A 
different picture of QI work may have emerged at the 
time of our data collection had we studied other wards.
conclusIons
We found that Productive Ward has had a lasting 
impact on specific ward practices; some material and 
processual changes have remained in place for up to 
a decade after initial implementation. In this widest 
sense five of our six case studies could be described as 
having seen some form of sustained impact from the 
Productive Ward over the last decade. However, as an 
ongoing QI approach—continually used to identify and 
improve problem areas—Productive Ward has been 
less successful. The resources available at the point of 
adoption and the—closely related—issue of how the 
Productive Ward was then implemented locally, shaped 
the evolving forms of assimilation into routine practice 
over time; these and wider contextual changes largely 
determined the legacies of the programme.
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